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The year 1989 marked the beginning of a new wave of political reform in 
Africa. Most one-party or military regimes had lost legitimacy domestically 
and internationally and calls for a return to multi-party politics became 
widespread. The causes for this wave of political reform were multiple, both 
domestic and international. They include disillusionment with economie 
performance, corruption and abuse of power by the ruling parties as well as 
diffusion effects of the democratie upheaval in Eastern Europe, the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and consequent end to the bipolar world System. 
At the same time, the end of the bipolar world System also took away 
the political motive for donor governments to support 'friendly' though 
aufhoritarian governments. Democratization obtained an important place on the 
international development agenda. Currently, it is considered to be an essential 
element of 'good governance'.1 Donor governments have pledged to consider 
democratization either in the form of conditionality, or in a more 'positive 
approach' attempting to support programs or projects which contribute to 
democratization.2 The increased use of conditionality led some to comment 
that Africa is being re-colonized.3 The extent of donor influence in African 
political reform remains subject of debate. It is beyond doubt that the pres-
sures exerted by domestic forces have been formidable, and the outcome 
dépends primarily on the balance of power between opposition groups and 
ruling elites in a specific country. However, where this balance is very 
delicate and governments are particularly dépendent upon donor funds, donor 
policies may influence state responses to populär demands for reform 
significantly. 
The media paid much attention to the introduction of multi-party 
élections. In observing these reforms, early optimists had spoken of Africa's 
'second libération'. 4 By 1993, however, a sobering record of setbacks led to a 
new pessimism. In some cases, reform constituted little more than a cosmetic 
change with the ruling partly remaining firmly in power. Elections stirred up 
ethnie conflict in some cases. Both optimists and pessimists, however, tend to 
oversimplify the problem of democratization by expecting linear trends (either 
progress or régression) toward a presumably clear goal. In reality neither the 
goal is sufficiently clear, nor the institutions or the process by which it may be 
attained. As Larry Diamond put it: Tf progress is made toward developing 
democratie government, it is likely to be graduai, messy, fitful and slow, with 
many imperfections along the way.' 5 
While multi-party élections may constitute an important step towards 
democratization, the emphasis on multi-party élections leaves several very fun-
damental issues unaddressed. If the new concern with democracy is to lead to 
the adoption of sustainable patterns of democratie politics, the highly 
normative and multiple meanings of the concept of democracy need to be 
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translatée into spécifie institutional choices: which démocratie model will Afri-
cans adopt in their quest for reform? And how do the societal conditions 
surrounding reform influence the outeome? What are the implications for our 
time perspective? 
Before addressing thèse issues we need to make explicit what is meant 
here by democracy and why at ail we should be concerned with democrati-
zation in Africa. Our interest in democratization is linked to a conceptuali-
zation of development revolving around expanding the choices and capabilities 
of individuals. This view implies that democracy is not only a means to a 
given end (development) but also an end in itself. It is hard indeed to conceive 
of any kind of development which is centered around human values without 
expanding the control of citizens over the state. Furthermore, Africans 
themselves have shown their own aspirations to achieve democracy. In the 
past, many Africans have attempted to show that one-party Systems could be 
démocratie - although thèse views have now been proven to be mistaken. Pre-
sently, African opposition groups ail firmly object to authoritarianism in its 
varied forms and attempt to replace it with democracy. 
How, then, can increased control over the state be achieved? A first 
condition for democracy is that citizens can elect their government by being 
presented a choice among competing parties. But ensuring compétition 
between parties is not enough. We need to go beyond a purely procédural 
définition of democracy. More substantive criteria for democracy may be 
deduced from the requirement that the choice offered to citizens must be 
meaningful. Thus, a second condition has to do with the kind of parties which 
présent themselves to citizens: is there a viable opposition? Finally, in a 
democracy the policies pursued must in some way reflect the préférences of 
citizens. This implies that, as a third condition, mechanisms are needed for the 
articulation and aggregation of interests which are to be fed into the policy 
making process. 
In this paper two arguments will be advanced in an effort to broaden 
the scope of the current discourse on African democratization. Firstly, the for-
mal requirement of multi-party élections is not sufficient to mark progress 
towards democratization. More substantive criteria need to be addressed such 
as whefher multi-party compétition makes any différence in the choices 
presented to citizens. What kind of opposition émerges? Is there any capacity 
to alternate in office or participate in government? This question can only be 
answered if we broaden the scope of inquiry into the nature of civil societies 
in African countries, where a capacity to articulate and aggregate political 
demands must be présent. We will examine whether such prerequisites in the 
realm of civil society obtained in African countries allow the création of me-
chanisms whereby societal interests can be fed into the policy process. Second-
ly, important institutional choices are to be made on the road to democracy 
with respect to électoral Systems and constitutional raies. We argue that the 
reform agenda should be broadened to include reform of the électoral System 
and constitutional raies. 
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In the following sections thèse issues will be further developed with 
particular référence to two anglophone countries of East África. First, a brief 
background on the countries upon which the argument is based is necessary. 
Kenya and Tanzania: background to reform 
Kenya and Tanzania share many similarities bofh culturally and politically. 
Both former British colonies inherited a Westminster System at independence: 
parliaments were elected on the basis of single member districts, which could 
be won with a plurality of votes. In both cases, the experiment with parlia-
mentary government was extremely short-lived. Republicanism was adopted 
soon after independence with a strong executive in the form of a président. 
The powers of parliament were reduced drastically. At the same time oppositi-
ons were eradicated and a 'unitary party' acquired dominance: the Kenya Afri-
can Nationalist Union (KANU) in Kenya and the Tanganyika African Nati-
onalist Union (TANU, in 1977 reconstituted into the Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM)) in Tanzania. 
Proponents of the African one-party State had often mirrored the ideas 
of Rousseau revolving around 'the will of the people'.6 This vision implied a 
unitary conception of 'the people.' African one-party leaders suggested they 
were executing the will of the people in advancing univerally desired outcomes 
such as nation-building and economic development. In practice this meant that 
in the one-party State mechanisms to Channel préférences of Citizens to the 
political center were very limited: they were monopolized by the single party 
which claimed to know the will of the people. In the process, associations 
outside of the party-state configuration were eifher suppressed or tightly 
controlled. Although pluralism in society was severely circumscribed, this did 
not mean the System was completely closed. Indeed, in several African one-
party states, there had been a degree of compétition between leaders of the 
same party. In this compétition, policy issues did not play a significant role, 
since all candidates had to adhère to the ideology and policies of the single 
party. 
In the course of time, single party rule degenerated into authoritarian 
politics. Constitutions were amended to allow concentration of power without 
significant checks on the executive. Policies were formulated in increasingly 
closed forum and possibilities for an open public debate were severely circum-
scribed. While the Kenyan variety of single party rule was more personalistic 
and autocratie, the Tanzanian variety was more ideological and bureaucratie.7 
In bofh countries, politics remained highly personal revolving around 
clientelistic exchanges.8 'Neo-patrimonialism' implied a linkage role for 
politicans who could exchange political support for access to resources of the 
center. The stability of the System depended much on the création of strong 
local power bases by patrons, which was facilitated by the electoral System 
based on single member districts and by their access to resources at the center. 
The nature of thèse exchanges has been characterized as 'hegemonial exchan-
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ge': while they do involve reciprocities, they are not equal and not directed at 
Substantive policy issues. Politicians extract resources from the center, but do 
not seek a change of policies pursued by the political center. The process is 
not without costs: it is fragile, it limits the scope of political participation and 
it may at some point lead to loss of legitimacy.9 This point seems to have been 
reached in the 1980s with the deepening of the economie crisis. While 
resources for distribution dwindled, the System was highly prone to abuse. 
Nepotism and corruption by the political class became important issues around 
which opposition emerged. 
The call for democratization was received with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm in both countries. In Tanzania the immense authority of ex-
president Nyerere stood behind calls for a multi-party system. It became 
populär to say that 'even God permitted opposition by allowing Satan to live 
among his people'. The current President A l i Hassan Mwinyi installed a 
committee to investigate needed constitutional changes. The committee's 
recommendations resulted in constitutional amendments to lift the monopoly of 
the party in power, and the élections scheduled for 1995 will be multi-party. 
Like many other African autocrats, however, President Daniel Arap Moi of 
Kenya countered that multi-party politics would spell ethnie strife. President 
Moi said that multi-party politics was a foreign ideology 'peddled by some 
unpatriotic people with borrowed brains'.10 However, increasing pressures 
from domestic groups coupled with international pressure exerted in the 
context of the Donors' Consultative Group Meeting of December 1991 led to 
the announcement that élections were to be held in December 1992. These 
élections, however, which were won by the ruling party, met with serious 
criticism on account of their degree of fairness. 
Both countries have embarked on a journey towards democracy. Unlike 
the expérience of some former French colonies, no 'National Conference' has 
been formed claiming sovereignty in setting the terms of the transition. The 
ruling parties remained fully in charge during the transition. Both C C M and 
K A N U attempt to control the reform agenda and limit the losses to the 
incumbent leadership. We may therefore classify the process of reform in both 
countries as a 'managed transition'.11 
Multi-party politics and the choices offered to Citizens 
In both Kenya and Tanzania the first area of political reform concerned the 
lifting of the monopoly of the single party by allowing the formation of other 
parties. Thus, the potential scope for political compétition was broadened. But 
to assess whether such measures of political liberalization contribute to 
democratization, we need to examine the actual scope of political compétition. 
What type of political parties emerged in African countries since the lifting of 
the ban on political parties? With what kind of issues do parties appeal to 
Citizens? Do the new political parties constitue a viable opposition? Three 
features characterize the emerging landscape of political parties in Kenya and 
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Tanzania: fragmentation, an urban and élite basis, and the lack of a cohérent 
or crédible policy programme.12 These feautures should be understood in 
relation to the broader societal conditions defining the context of political 
reform. 
In the case of Kenya, we have seen the émergence first of a broad 
forum for the reinstatement of democracy (FORD), which was bound together 
predominantly by a broadly shared critique of the incumbant party: corruption, 
abuse of power, and economic mismanagement. A younger génération of 
lawyers and Professionals played important rôles in this coalition. There was 
little time for this coalition to develop a cohérent policy programme. 
Government harassment stood in the way of its effective Organization while 
internai leadership clashes led to divisions. The opposition disintegrated into 
rivalling factions based on ethnicity or clan politics. It appears that the oppo-
sition movement was taken over by older génération politicians which had 
been ousted from power and sought to re-enter political life. Thus, FORD 
split into two camps, and other parties emerged representing separate ethnie 
groups. FORD did not manage to transform itself from an opposition 
movement into a viable political party. 
The Kenyan scénario did not show any significant programmatic issues 
which divided thèse groups, but rather the struggle for access to the center by 
creating a strong local power base.13 The continuation of factional politics 
points to the the persistence of neo-patrimonial politics in another guise. In 
this System leaders seek to link their constituencies to the resources of the 
center, and fhey might just as well change parties as soon as this enhances 
their ability to distribute resources. In fact we have seen the crossing of party 
boundaries in the Kenyan expérience. In this way, parties do not présent 
Citizens with meaningful choices. The électoral System reinforced this style of 
politics. Intense compétition between groups reflects the zéro sum nature of 
the électoral system based on the 'winner takes all' principle: in single-
member districts, the candidate with a mere plurality of votes obtains the 
entire seat (in other words, a relative majority is sufficient). The opposition 
has not been able to organize the kind of cohérence which would enable them 
to actually occupy the government. 
In the case of Tanzania, new parties have been formed since registrati-
on officially opened in June of 1992. Important leaders who had formerly 
operated within the one-party framework have formed opposition parties (e.g. 
Chief Fundikira, Speaker of the House of Assembly). More than 40 parties 
have been formed since then, while two efforts were made to arrive at a broa-
der forum or coalition. Both efforts failed due to divisions between thèse 
emerging groups. Distrust and rivalry between the leadership seem to be the 
main cause of failure.14 As in the case of Kenya, the intense power struggle is 
linked to the électoral system: since the single member district system was 
maintained, the expectation is that 'the winner takes ail ' , which renders 
politics a zero-sum political game. 
Policy issues remain rather elusive on the opposition side. In an 
overview of the policy issues presented by six opposition parties, Mmuya and 
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Chaligha point to major inconsistencies and lack of credibility. Thus free 
éducation and health services appear on the programme of most of fhem, while 
there is no indication of the sources of finance for thèse services. Aspiring 
leaders thus try to capitalize on the discontent with current austerity measures 
wifhout seeking to formulate an alternative. The parties are rather unclear 
about the rôle of the state in the economy, paying lip-service to the new creed 
of privatization and free markets, while at the same time continuing to advoca-
te state shares in enterprises and a large rôle for the government in the 
economy.15 The fragmentation of the opposition and the lack of policy alter-
natives does not help to establish credibility with the electorate and the 
opposition can hardly be called viable. 
The unviability of current opposition groups may be traced in part to 
the legacy of one party raie. Manipulation by the party in power has contribu-
ted to the fragmentation and weakness of opposition parties. In both Kenya 
and Tanzania, opposition groups have been hindered by the government in 
organizing rallies and meetings in the districts. In the case of Kenya, ethnie 
conflict was stirred up by the ruling party's following. Moreover, the média 
continue to be under government control. Although a broader range of views 
enters the daily newspapers, critical journalists have also been harassed. Thus, 
until the ruling party has loosened its grip on the state apparatus and its con-
trol over the média, the contest between ruling and opposition parties will not 
be an equal one. In Tanzania, the highly sensitive issue of the union with 
Zanzibar and the émergence of religion as a divisive issue complicate the 
opening up of the political system. Basically, the current leadership has 
declared the issues around the type of union with the islands as an issue 
beyond the scope of reform. 
The unviability of the opposition is also linked to certain constraints at 
the level of leadership and to the nature of African civil societies. The long 
term exclusion from political power has prevented the accumulation of know-
ledge and expérience on the part of political leaders in serving as a link 
between citizens and the state. African leaders exhibit a culture associated with 
the neo-patrimonial style of politics. They often lack a capacity to présent 
viable policy alternatives. The neo-patrimonial linkages are fragmentary and 
on a dyadic basis. The problem with clientelistic exchanges is that they remain 
highly personal and do not contribute to the création of forms of trust and 
reciprocity beyond those narrow relations, as aptly put by Hyden. 1 6 Peter 
Lewis argued that African democratization fundamentally dépends on the 
émergence of a 'political society': a stratum of people professionally engaged 
in politics, who serve as a linkage between citizens and the state by articu-
lating and aggregating interests.17 Both the culture and the structures which 
allow for the articulation and aggregation of interests in society are rudimenta-
ry. Thus, an important challenge for African democratization concerns the 
strengthening of civil society, a process requiring a broader approach and a 
longer time perspective than is prévalent. 
The concept of 'civil society' requires some clarification here, since 
civil society encompasses more than the existence of voluntary associations in 
94 
African democratization 
society. Rather, 'civil society' is defined by its paradoxical relation to the 
state: it is simultaneously arrayed against the state and engaged with the 
state.18 While it is characterized by its assertion of autonomy vis a vis the 
state, it is simultaneously shaped by the state. In particular, the opportunities 
and constraints provided by state policies influence the formation and public 
role of civil associations: civil society is engaged with the state. Inherently, 
civil society entails pluralism: it entails an array of separate and discretionary 
interests, because individuals associate on the basis of perceived interests. At 
the same time, civil society is unified by a minimum of cohesion. This 
cohesion is provided not by uniformity or similarity, but by consensus on the 
fundamental rules of the political regime. 'Civi l society' presupposes 
citizenship, which is here conceptualized as an identity of individuals vis a vis 
the state. A sense of citizenship is closely connected to the legitimacy of 
states. 
The weakness of civil society is intimately connected with the material 
conditions in African countries. Low levels of economic development imply 
that essential prerequisites for associational life such as transport and commu-
nications form a great obstacle. The formidable logistical problems in 
transport and communication mean that face to face contacts remain the 
dominant form of comminication. 
However, the kind of political development pursued since independence 
had important implications for African civil society as well. Briefly captured, 
African regimes tended to be hegemonic: they exhibited a great concentration 
of power and they tended to be highly interventionist. While the state thus 
gained a near omnipresence, this did not imply state strength. Indeed, African 
states were weak, 'soft', swollen but ineffective.19 Patterns of governance 
undermined the legitimacy of the state. Superficially, the state seemed to have 
virtually submerged civil society. In reality, a rich associational life characteri-
zed African society.20 Within informal self-help groups or community organi-
zations, people have pursued their own objectives parallel to the structures of 
the state or even obstructing state structures. These patterns of associational 
life reflected the illegitimacy of the state. But the richness of such forms of 
associational life does not imply the presence of a strong civil society as 
conceived here. The kind of associations prevalent in the context of African 
authoritarian or hegemonic regimes tend to reflect the weak and illegitimate 
character of the state. While the official state-sanctioned organizations -
characterized by their unitarian philosophy - became 'hollow' 2 1, informal asso-
ciations were characterized precisely by fragmentation and disengagement 
from the state. The weakness of the African state meant that few incentives 
existed to form autonomous organizations to engage with the state: rather, the 
'exit' option prevailed as individuals preferred to remain outside the reach of 
the state. Therefore, civil society in many African countries is weak. 
The recent recognition of the importance of civil society in Africa 
meant that the so-called NGOs (non-governmental organizations) received 
more and more attention in the formulation and implementation of deve-
lopment policies. Following the disillusionment with the development 
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performance of African states, they had already obtained an increasing role as 
a Channel for aid during the 1980s. Now, they were also to be agents of 
democratization. The recent Human Development Report considered NGOs an 
important means to achieve participation.22 
Several observations, however, serve to modify such high expectations 
about the role of NGOs. These hopes may be in vain in light of the prevailing 
development stratégies and structures of accountability withm the NGO 
sector.23 Dependence on donor funds tends to diverge accountability away 
from local constituencies to donor organizations. In addition, African govern-
ments have increasingly used legal instruments to limit the potential of NGOs 
to play a significant political role. The potential for NGOs to fulfil a role in 
policy advocacy remains limited up tili now due to constraints in their political 
environment and the lack of a domestic funding base, while their membership 
constituencies often lack a basis in common interests.24 Moreover, NGOs 
constitue only a part of what is meant here by civil society. Generally, NGOs 
are organizations of or for so-called 'target groups' of the poor or marginali-
zed. They are often rather narrowly based and have not developed many links 
to other sectors of society. Civil society encompasses a much broader range of 
associations including professional and interest associations of middle groups. 
These groups are essential to the formation of civil society. If democratization 
is to take roots in Africa, it is extremely important that such civil associations 
obtain a certain room to organize and articulate interests vis a vis state policy 
makers. 
The weakness of civil society in Africa constitutes an important 
constraint in the democratization process. We have traced mis weakness to 
both the prevailing material conditions and the role of the state up tili now. 
The first condition cannot be overcome overnight and will therefore continue 
to present constraints. The latter implies that there is something governments 
can do in fhe short run. In the pursuit of political reform, there is a role for 
government now to increase the political space for civil society: legal and 
social pre-conditions should be created for self-organization and the pursuit of 
diverse interests. Governments should remove the many legal obstacles 
currently existing. If democratization is to take roots in Africa, a broad range 
of civil and interest associations should obtain room to organize and articulate 
interests vis a vis state policy makers. Mechanisms should be created to 
increase civil associations' involvement in the policy making process. This 
entails possibilities for lobbying, but also the création and actual use of 
advisory or consultative bodies. Clearly, political reform should go beyond the 
holding of multi-party élections and address the opening up of policy making 
processes simultaneously. Thus, for political reform to be succesful, both a 
broader approach and a longer time perspective are required. 
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Institutional choices: models of democracy 
The agenda for African political reform also remains rather limited with 
respect to the institutional choices to be made. A much heard comment about 
recent concern for African democratization is that this constitutes the 
imposition of a 'Western model' upon Africans. Political reforms, however, 
imply choice among a variety of democratic models - all entailing multi-party 
politics - which Africans might opt for. Precise institutional arrangements vary 
widely even in existing Western democracies. Instead of rhetorical emphasis 
on a presumed 'Western' model, we need to examine several models of 
democracy which evolved in differing social and cultural conditions and which 
are rooted in different theoretical approaches. Some of these, in particular 
those evolved in the context of plural and divided societies, may prove of 
great value to Africans today.25 Thus, the debate should change its focus from 
the broad normative goals, to which all will at least nominally agree, to the 
institutional choices to be made. 
A vast body of literature on democracy led to an equally vast conceptu-
al and theoretical classification of democratic systems. In outlining some of the 
institutional choices to be made, we will follow Arend Lijphart in his 
distinction of two broad types of democracies: majoritarian democracy and 
consensus democracy. We will also discuss a mixed type, in particular a 
muted majoritarian model. This classification revolves centrally, though not 
exclusively, around the type of electoral system adopted. 
Majoritarian democracy is well known in both its parliamentary form 
(the Westminster model) and its presidential form (United States). The elec-
toral system is based on single member districts. It tends to produce a clear 
winner and reduces the loser to the oppositional role. We know this system by 
the adage 'the winner takes all ' . The possibility of alteration of parties in 
power secures that oppositions remain 'loyal'. Such systems tend towards a 
two-party system, but regional parties or larger third parties may emerge. The 
presidential variety in the USA is characterized furthermore by federalism, 
which disperses power among territorially defined units. In this way, some 
possible excesses of majoritarian rule are avoided. The majoritarian type of 
democracy fares well in relatively homogeneous societies. Is has been argued 
that it is less suitable for segmented societies. Depending on the precise dis-
tribution of the population over electoral districts it may lead to a large degree 
of distortion in representation: ethnic, religious or political minorities may 
become underrepresented while majorities may dominate the national 
executive. 
Consensus democracy challenges the basic concept of majoritarian rule. 
One of the earlier writers elaborating its basic features - without labelling it as 
such - was Sir Arthur W. Lewis, in an explanation of the failure of majori-
tarian democracy in post independence West African countries.26 Arend 
Lijphart elaborated the model based on an analysis of the Dutch political 
system - which he called 'consociational democracy' -, extending it later to 
include other countries with religiously or ethnically divided populations.27 
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Three characteristics define what Lijphart later preferred to call the consensus 
model: proportional representation, autonomy for separate groups and power 
sharing. 
The electoral system is based on proportional representation, allowing 
all political groups an amount of seats in the legislature proportional to their 
percentage of total votes. The country may constitute one large district, or be 
divided in a number of districts each with multiple seats. The executive is a 
coalition of the major political parties. The model seeks to include representa-
tion of all significant political groups to manage the country's affairs. The 
political groups maintain a degree of autonomy at the same time with regard to 
the management of their own affairs. While societies may exhibit potentially 
divisive segmentation, Lijphart argues that the consensus model promotes 
stability. Political elites are prone to accommodation and reconciliation. The 
success of this system depends critically on the behavior of political elites, 
who realize they must accommodate in order to maintain governability. Within 
this system, political parties may proliferate and are frequently based on reli-
gious, ethnic or cultural factors - a situation which is not considered inap-
propriate or disadvantageous. Lijphart's model has been influential in one 
African country only: it has been proposed as a solution for South Africa 2 8, 
but it has received criticism both on theoretical and on practical grounds.29 A n 
important criticism voiced against the model concerns the reliance on the 
benign behavior of political elites to achieve accommodation. 
In a critique of Lijphart's model, Horowitz developed another model 
suitable for ethnically or religiously divided societies.30 I will call this model, 
which may be seen as falling between the two types of democracy described 
above, a 'muted majoritarian model'. Horowitz's model, too, has been 
presented as a possible solution for South Africa. As in the consensus model, 
it is designed to produce accommodation and compromise, but rather through 
the electoral system. Instead of reliance on the conciliatory behavior of 
political elites, Horowitz seeks electoral mechanisms which produce incentives 
to compromise and accomodate between different groups. The essence of the 
mechanism is 'vote pooling': by requiring citizens to give alternative votes 
(second or third preferences), leaders of different groups are bound to attract 
votes beyond their 'own' constituencies. Thus parties will pool the votes they 
receive as first preferences with those received from other groups in the form 
of second or third preferences. No one can win on the basis of a clear majori-
ty based on first preferences, but must gather support as second or third prefe-
rence (an assumption made in the model is that all districts have a heteroge-
neous population and that ethnic groups are not geographically concentrated). 
Thus, incentives are built in the electoral system to produce parties which do 
not exclusively mirror religious or ethnic divisions, but reach out to other 
constituencies. The required compromise or accomodation is reached at an 
earlier stage than in the consensus model: at the stage of gathering support in 
the electoral process and even party formation. While Horowitz's model is an 
example of a muted majoritarian model, other systems have been developed 
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which aim to mix éléments of proportionalism with majoritarianism, such as in 
the German électoral System. 
African political Systems nearly ail entail basically the majoritarian 
model in a unitary state. National assemblies were chosen directly by the 
people in single member districts, (e.g. Tanzania, Kenya). A plurality of votes 
was sufficient to gain a seat in Parliament. Minorities could only be presented 
in Parliament if they were concentrated in an électoral district. The President 
picks the members of his cabinet from among the elected or nominated MPs. 
With the introduction of the Executive Presidency, in both countries a number 
of seats in Parliament were nominated by him - allowing de executive to 
become even less représentative. 
With the issue of multi-party politics emerging on the political agenda, 
the arguments used in the early 1960s to discrédit multi-partyism were reitera-
ted by opponents of reform. Ethnie différences would spell divisive politics. 
While récalcitrant incumbents were correct in emphasizing the plural nature of 
their societies, they did not appear to acknowledge the importance of the type 
of électoral Systems within which they were to introduce multi-party 
compétition. In fact, ethnie politics could thrive even within the single party 
framework, expressed through personalistic clientelism. Now the fear was that 
ethnie identities would be institutionally expressed in the party system. 
Opponents of reform did not acknowledge that depending on the constitutional 
design of the system, ethnie parties do not necessarily threaten the stability of 
the system. The debate of political reform does not address thèse issues and 
assumes the électoral system adopted at independence to be a constant. In both 
Kenya and Tanzania, when the monopoly of the single party was lifted by 
constitutional amendment, the électoral system with single member 
constituencies was maintained, with a plurality of votes sufficient to win a 
district. The majoritarian system with the winner taking all was not 
challenged. 
Some électoral provisions were used, however, in an attempt to prevent 
ethnie party formation or the domination of a regional or ethnie group.31 In 
Tanzania, it was decided that ail parties should be national; they should not be 
based on race, ethnicity religion or gender. A requirement for the registration 
of a party was that it should be sponsored by at least 200 members from each 
of at least 10 régions in the country, among which should be the islands.32 In 
Kenya the government ruled that any party should obtain a certain percentage 
of votes in a certain number of régions. 3 3 In the cases of Kenya and Tanzania, 
thèse requirements tend to bolster the position of the party in power, which 
can build on its decades-long prominence in the entire country. It is difficult 
for any new grouping to practically gather votes beyond its area of origin. In 
the context of the legacy of one-party dominance, thèse requirements and 
indeed, the maintenance of the 'winner take ail' électoral system are bénéficiai 
to the incumbent parties. 
As convincingly argued by Lijphart, the 'winner take ail' électoral 
system is not particularly suitable in countries marked by ethnie or religious 
pluriformity. Proportional représentation and other éléments of the consensus 
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model could mitigate the potentially divisive tendencies within African 
societies. Besides such institutional reforms, a change in political culture 
would also contribute to the construction of a viable political system. By 
recognizing pluralism as existent and legitimate, the self-fulfilling prophesy 
inherent in the unitary approach would disappear. The formation of parties on 
an ethnic basis does not in itself constitute a threat to the stability of the 
political system, as is commonly argued. Ethnicity is not a fixed identity with 
fixed political implications. Much depends on the way political leaders 
mobilize their constituencies. The self-fulfilling prophesy inherent in the 
unitary approach may be transformed into a self-denying prophesy, as leaders 
recognize they must accomodate in order to prevent political instability. In the 
view of Lijphart, proportionality in the electoral system and elite attitudes 
favoring power sharing would render politics a positive sum game instead of 
the zero-sum situation inherent in the majoritarian system. In the view of 
Horowitz, the electoral mechanism of vote pooling would build in incentives 
to compromise. The argument here does not imply that either solution is 
without problems in actual practice. Indeed, the assumption about the enlighte-
ned and rational behavior in the Lijphart model can in practice prove to be 
problematic, while the system proposed by Horowitz presents practical 
problems due to its complexity and the condition that electoral districts are 
heterogeneous. The purpose of the argument is to broaden the scope of debate 
about the actual institutional choices available in African political reform. 
While it is not surprising that ruling parties have kept such more 
fundamental reforms of the electoral system off the reform agenda, it is 
surprising that this issue received little attention from general observers within 
the donor community. Neither have emerging opposition groups in Kenya and 
Tanzania put this issue on the reform agenda -with the exception of one 
opposition group in Tanzania (the NCCR). This may partly be explained by 
the persistent influence of the colonial heritage. At the same time, opposition 
groups may hold the rather unrealistic hope that they might 'win and take all ' . 
In the worst case, opposition groups simply wish to seize power and continue 
a style of governance marked by concentration of power, lack of 
accountability and checks and balances. 
Broader constitutional reforms to address these issues have been 
granted a lower priority on the reform agenda compared to the multi-party 
issue. The models of democracy we discussed above share some fundamental 
constitutional features such as guarantees for civil rights, the rule of law and a 
degree of delimitation of governmental powers either by checks and balances 
or by strict separation of powers. The relatively low priority of these issues is 
in part due to the efforts of ruling parties to keep them off the agenda while 
acceding to the most vocal demands of donors and opposition groups. A case 
in point is that of the powers of Parliament. Thus, while Kenyans were to 
elect a new parliament under multi-party competition, Parliament in Kenya 
continues to possess few powers to hold the executive accountable. The 
President can continue to nominate a number of MPs. In Tanzania, opposition 
groups have called for the restoration of the supremacy of Parliament, but the 
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incumbent President managed to keep important powers to amend laws. Other 
mechanisms to act as a check on the executive, such as an independent judi-
ciary, remain severely constrained. Concentration of power continues to 
characterize the System and is reinforced by majoritarianism. Such broader 
constitutional reforms deserve a central place on the reform agenda. 
Conclusion 
A change in prevailing attitudes concerning African democratization is 
essential. A narrow focus on multi-party élections obscures many more 
fundamental issues, and implies unrealistic expectations regarding the success 
of reform. The potential danger is that disappointments may contribute to 
reversais in attempts to democratize African political Systems. 
Democratization dépends fundamentally, firstly, upon the conditions 
defining the context of political reform and secondly upon the institutional 
choices made in the pursuit of political reform. If the contextual issues linked 
to African political reform are recognized, the expectations about the results 
will be more realistic and more sensitive to conditions in African countries. 
Moreover, the time perspective of political change will be longer. If a broader 
scope of institutional choices in political reform is considered, painful or even 
dangerous mistakes may be avoided. 
A n important implication of this argument is that research into both the 
societal conditions surrounding political reform and the varieties of constitutio-
nalism appropriate to African contexts needs to be increased. Such research 
could help to broaden the scope of the debate about African political reforms 
and change the perceptions about the options in reform. As the perceptions 
and expectations of actors in this process may influence actual reform measu-
res, a broadened and more realistic perspective can itself become a positive 
factor in the process of African democratization. 
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